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Abstract
We present a simple, efficient, and secure data-oblivious randomized shuffle algorithm. This is the
first secure data-oblivious shuffle that is not based on sorting. Our method can be used to improve
previous oblivious storage solutions for network-based outsourcing of data.
1 Introduction
One of the unmistakable recent trends in networked computation and distributed information management
is that of cloud storage (e.g., see [15]), whereby users outsource data to external servers that manage and
provide access to their data. Such services relieve users from the burden of backing up and having to
maintain access to their data across multiple computing platforms, but, in return, such services also introduce
privacy concerns. For instance, it is likely that cloud storage providers will want to perform data mining on
user data, and it is also possible that such data will be subject to government searches. Thus, there is a need
for algorithmic solutions that preserve the desirable properties of cloud storage while also providing privacy
protection for user data.
Of course, users can encrypt data they outsource to the cloud, but this alone is not sufficient to achieve
privacy protection, because the data access patterns that users exhibit can reveal information about the
content of their data (e.g., see [4, 14]). Therefore, there has been considerable amount of recent research
on algorithms for data-oblivious algorithms and storage, which hide data access patterns for cloud-based
network data management solutions (e.g., see [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 18, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26]). Such solutions
typically work by obfuscating a sequence of data accesses intended by a client by simulating it with the one
that appears indistinguishable from a random sequence of data accesses. Often, such a simulation involves
mixing the intended (real) accesses with a sequence of random “dummy” accesses. In addition, so as to
never access the same address twice (which would reveal a correlation), such obscuring simulations also
involve continually moving items around in the server’s memory space. For this reason, the “inner-loop”
computation required by such simulations is a data-oblivious shuffling operation, which moves a set of items
to random locations in fashion that disallows the server to correlate the previous locations of items with their
new locations. This inner-loop process requires putting items in new locations that are independent of their
old locations while hiding the correlations between the two.
The most common way this inner-loop shuffling is implemented is, however, computationally expensive,
since it involves assigning random (or pseudo-random) indices to items and then performing a data-oblivious
sorting of these index-item pairs. Examples of such oblivious sorting algorithms include Batcher’s sorting
network [3], which requires O(n(log n)2) I/Os to sort data of size n, or the AKS [1] or Zig-zag sorting [8]
networks, which use O(n log n) I/Os, but with large constant factors that restrict their practicality. These
algorithms are used in oblivious storage solutions by having a client use the server as an external memory,
with the I/Os directing the client to issue commands to move items from the server to the client’s private
memory and from the client’s private memory to the server. Though these solutions achieve a desired privacy
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level, they are expensive in their (amortized) access overhead time and also in their monetary cost when one
considers a client outsourcing large volumes of data and accessing it from a cloud server that charges per
every data request.
In this paper, therefore, we are interested in algorithmic improvements for oblivious storage solutions,
in terms of their conceptual complexity, constant factors, and monetary costs. For instance, since cloud-
storage servers typically charge users for each memory access but have fairly large bounds on the size of
the messages for such I/Os, we allow for messages to have modest sizes, such as O(
√
n) for a storage of
size n. This necessarily also implies that the client has an equally modest-sized private memory, in which
to send and receive such messages (and also in which to perform internal swaps of data items away from
the prying eyes of the server). Our goal in this research is to take advantage of such frameworks to replace
data-oblivious sorting with simple oblivious data shuffling for the sake of providing simple, efficient, and
cheap outsourced data management. Our framework, therefore, involves designing (or modifying) oblivious
storage simulation algorithms where a client stores n items at the server and is allowed to issue a sequence
of I/Os, each of which is a batch of reads and writes for the server’s memory, for reasonable assumptions on
message size and private memory size.
Related Work. A shuffle is an algorithm for rearranging an array to achieve a random permutation of its
elements. Early shuffle methods were motivated by the problem of shuffling a deck of cards.
Classic card shuffle methods (e.g., Knuth (or Fisher-Yates) [17], the riffle shuffle [2], Thorp shuffle [24])
are not data-oblivious, however, as anyone observing card swaps or riffles (interleaving two subdecks) of
such methods can learn the final output permutation. In ICALP 2012, Goodrich and Mitzenmacher [10]
showed that one can, in fact, shuffle a deck of n cards and guarantee that an observer cannot find a particular
card in the output permutation with probability better than O(1/n). However, this algorithm is not an
effective shuffle for our purposes, since the output permutations produced by the algorithm are not all equally
likely and there may be dependencies between large groups of cards that could be leaked. Most other existing
efficient data-oblivious shuffling methods assign random values to the elements of the array and use a data-
oblivious algorithm to sort the array according to these values.
Our Oblivious Shuffling Results. Our Melbourne shuffle1 algorithm is instead the first data-oblivious
shuffle method that is not based on a data-oblivious sorting algorithm. In Table 1, we compare the Mel-
bourne shuffle, showing that it outperforms sorting-based shuffle methods.
Table 1: Comparison of data-oblivious sorting and shuffle algorithms over n items.
Ra
nd
om
iz
ed Private
Memory
Message
Size
External
Memory I/Os
Batcher’s network [3] O(1) O(1) O(n) O(n(log n)2)
Batcher’s network I O(
√
n) O(
√
n) O(n) O(
√
n(log n)2)
Batcher’s network II [9] O(
√
n) O( 8
√
n) O(n) O(n7/8)
AKS [1], Zig-zag sort [8] O(1) O(1) O(n) O(n log n)
Randomized shellsort [7] X O(√n) O(√n) O(n) O(√n log n)
Melbourne shuffle X O(√n) O(√n) O(n) O(√n)
Melbourne shuffle (c ≥ 3) X O( c√n) O( c√n) O(n) O(c c
√
nc−1)
Improved Oblivious Storage. Oblivious storage and oblivious RAM (ORAM) simulation solutions aim
at minimizing the access overhead, which is the amortized number of I/Os executed to perform a single stor-
1The name of our algorithm is inspired by a ‘‘shuffle’’ dance technique.
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age access request while keeping reasonable assumptions about the size of private memory and of messages
exchanged between the client and the server, e.g., sublinear in the size of outsourced memory n. In seminal
work motivated by a software protection application, Goldreich and Ostrovsky [5, 6] give two oblivious stor-
age solutions for a client with O(1) private memory size: the square root method with O(
√
n) overhead and
the hierarchical method with O((log n)3) overhead. The hierarchical method was recently extended using
techniques such as Bloom filters [25, 26] and cuckoo hash tables [9, 13, 18, 20]. E.g., the log n-hierarchical
solution of [13] uses O( d
√
n) temporary memory and achieves O(log n) access overhead, for d ≥ 2. In [18]
a similar method achieves O((log n)2/ log logn) overhead with O(1) private memory.
All the above oblivious storage solutions rely on a periodic data-oblivious shuffle of the server storage, a
task done using data-oblivious sorting. This is the most expensive step of such solutions, but since it happens
only after a certain number of requests, it can be amortized. Otherwise, one can use techniques of [11] to
deamortize these solutions to bring the worst case access overhead to be the same as the average case. Thus,
we can use our Melbourne shuffle to implement the shuffle steps of these algorithms.
Other oblivious storage solutions in [21, 22, 23] allow the user to have o(n) private memory and then
by applying the same solution recursively on this private memory bring it to o(1) and adding a log n over-
head. For example, Path ORAM [23] uses O(log n) (stateful) private memory and has O((log n)2) access
overhead.
As shown in Table 2, oblivious storage solutions based on our Melbourne shuffle are efficient and prac-
tical.
Table 2: Comparison of oblivious storage solutions for n items.
Private
Memory
Message
Size
External
Memory
Access
Overhead
SquareRoot [6] O(1) O(1) O(n) O(
√
n)
Path ORAM [23] O(log n) O(log n) O(n) O((log n)2)
Bucket Hash Hierarchical [6] O(1) O(1) O(n log n) O((log n)3)
Cuckoo Hash Hierarchical [13] (d ≥ 2) O( d√n) O( d√n) O(n) O(log n)
SquareRoot with Melbourne shuffle O(
√
n) O(
√
n) O(n) O(1)
Hierarchical with Melbourne shuffle O( c
√
n) O( c
√
n) O(n) O(c log n)
(c ≥ 3) O( c√n log n) O( c√n log n) O(n) O(c)
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Cryptographic Primitives
We analyze the security of cryptographic primitives and our protocol in terms of the probability of success
for an adversary in breaking them. Let k be a security parameter. We consider a probabilistic adversary A
whose running time is polynomial in k. We say that a scheme is secure if for every probabilistic polynomial
time (in k) (PPT) adversary A, the probability of breaking the scheme is at most some negligible function
negl(k), i.e., a function such that negl(k) < 1/|poly(k)| for every polynomial poly(k).
CPA Secure Encryption We use a symmetric encryption scheme (Enckey,Deckey) where key ← {0, 1}k.
We require this scheme to be secure against the chosen-ciphertext attack (CPA) for multiple messages [16].
During this attack an adversary A is allowed to make queries to oracles Enckey and Deckey on a polynomial
number of sequences of l messages of his choice. After this “warm-up” phase, A comes up with two
sequences, M0 and M1, of l messages and gives them to a challenger. The challenger secretly picks a bit b
and calls Enckey on each message of sequence Mb. Let C be the sequence of ciphertexts that correspond
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to Mb. The challenger gives C to A who continues querying Enckey and Deckey on any sequence of
ciphertexts except those in C for a polynomial number of times. Finally, the adversary’s task is to guess
bit b. We call the above game Enc-IND-CPA and say that A wins the game if he correctly guesses b. Then,
(Enckey,Deckey) is said to be secure if for all PPT adversaries, the probability of winning game Enc-IND-
CPA is at most 1/2 + negl(k). We omit using key when referring to (Enc,Dec). For an intuition behind
Enc-IND-CPA secure encryption scheme, consider encrypting a message padded with a different random
nonce each time it is encrypted. Hence, re-encryptions of the same plaintext look different with very high
probability.
Pseudo-Random Permutation (PRP) Consider an array of n elements that we wish to randomly rear-
range and letD = [1, n] be the set of indices ofA. We use a family of efficiently computable pseudo-random
permutations (PRPs) Πseed : D → D, keyed using a seed from the set Seeds(Π) = {0, 1}k [16]. In order
to pick a permutation, one picks a random seed from Seeds(Π) and stores it privately. Hence, whenever we
refer to choosing a permutation, we refer to picking a new seed ∈ Seeds(Π). Once the seed is fixed, we can
evaluate Πseed on a given index x ∈ D via Πseed(x).
The security of a family of PRPs is defined by comparing the behavior of a PPT adversary when he
is given a truly random permutation versus a pseudo-random permutation picked using a random seed.
Formally, letR be the set of all permutations over the domain D. A family of PRPs Π is secure if for every
probabilistic polynomial time adversary A, the probability of distinguishing between r $←− R and Πseed,
where seed $←− Seeds(Π), is 1/2 + negl(k).
Given an array A of n (key,value) pairs (x, v) where x ∈ [1, n], we denote the permutation pi of A as
B = pi(A), where pi = Πseed and B[x] = A[pi(x)], ∀x ∈ [1, n]. We will use the same notation when A and
B are encrypted. We refer to the original permutation of A, as permutation pi0. For A, sorted using x, pi0 is
the identity.
2.2 Storage Model
We consider a cloud storage model where a client stores a dataset at a server while keeping a small amount
of data in private memory. For simplicity, we assume that the dataset is an array of elements of equal
size. The client encrypts each element and stores the elements at the server according to a pseudo-random
permutation. The encryption key and the seed of the permutation are kept private by the client and are not
revealed to the server.
Client Private Memory We assume that the client has access to a small private memory, M , which is
comprised of permanent storage and scratch space. The permanent storage includes the encryption key and
the current seed of the permutation the client is using, which together is of size O(1). The rest of M is
used as a scratch space while performing operations on the remote storage and is not needed in between
operations. We require the size of the scratch space to be sublinear in n. Depending on the algorithm, we
will use a private storage of size c
√
n log n or c
√
n, for an arbitrary integer c ≥ 2.
Since the client can store a small number of elements at a time, we assume that he does not try to request
from the server more than he can fit and process in M . Let the message size, denoted msgSize, be the
maximum elements that can be exchanged by the client and server in one operation. We have that msgSize
should be less than the size of the scratch space.
Server Memory The server supports the following operations on an array S.
• get(S, loc): return element stored at a location loc in S.
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• put(S, loc, e): put element e to a location loc in S.
• getRange(S, loc, `): return an array a with elements at locations loc, . . . , loc + ` − 1 in S, where
` ≤ msgSize.
• putRange(S, loc, a): write elements in array a to locations loc, . . . , loc + |a| − 1 in S, where |a| ≤
msgSize.
• getRangeDist(S, 〈loc1, . . . , locc, 〉, 〈`1, . . . , `c, 〉): return an array awith elements at locations loci, . . . ,
loci + `i − 1 in S,∀i ∈ [1, c], where
∑
`i ≤ msgSize.
• putRangeDist(S, 〈loc1, . . . , locc〉, 〈a1, . . . , ac〉): write elements in each array ai to locations loci, . . . ,
loci + |ai| − 1 in S, where
∑ |ai| ≤ msgSize.
Note that the number of elements in getRange and putRange is limited by the maximum number of elements
that can be exchanged between the client and the server in one operation.
We assume that the server can perform operations get and put in constant time and operations getRange,
putRange, getRangeDist and putRangeDist in time proportional to the number of elements read or written,
but each operation takes one I/O.
Definition 2.1 (Metadata): The name of the array S, its size, location i, l, and the size of a are referred to
as the metadata of a getRange or a putRange call. Similarly for getRangeDist and putRangeDist, locations
〈loc1, . . . , locc〉, 〈`1, . . . , `c, 〉 and sizes of a1, . . . , ac are referred as metadata as well.
3 Oblivious Shuffle Model
In this section, we introduce a formal model for the oblivious shuffle of an array.
3.1 Model
Definition 3.1 (Shuffle): We define a shuffle S as a pair of algorithms (Setup, Shuffle), as follows.
• (s, S) ← Setup(1k) Given security parameter k, run the key generation algorithm for a symmetric
encryption scheme (Enc,Dec) and store the key in secret state s. Also, allocate an auxiliary datas-
tore S.
• (Enc(pi(A)), α) ← Shuffle(s, S,A, pi) Given secret state s, auxiliary data store S, an array input A,
and a permutation pi, return (1) the encryption of the permutation ofA according to pi; (2) a transcriptα
of the operations that transform Enc(A) to Enc(pi(A)) using auxiliary space S.
Transcript α is a sequence of l (request, response) pairs 〈(r1, g1), . . . , (rl, gl)〉 that capture the evolution of
the datastore via intermediate states S1, S2, . . . , Sl+1. An invariant on each intermediate state is to store an
encryption of some permutation ofA along with any auxiliary data. For example S1 contains Enc(A) and Sl
contains Enc(pi(A)). Setting S1 ← {Enc(A), S}, s0 ← s, g0 ← ⊥ define the relationship between ri and
gi as:
〈 (si, ri)← GenRequest(si−1, gi−1), (Si+1, gi)← GenResponse(Si, ri) 〉.
Operations GenRequest and GenResponse generate a request ri and a corresponding response gi and are
defined as follows:
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• (si, ri)← GenRequest(si−1, gi−1) Perform a computation based on a substructure of Si−1, gi−1, and
generate next request to Si, ri.
• (Si+1, gi) ← GenResponse(Si, ri) Generate the response to request ri on Si: Si+1 is the datastore
Si updated according to ri and gi is the response to ri with respect to Si. For example, if ri is a get
request, then Si+1 = Si and gi is the requested item. Also, if ri is a put request, then gi is empty.
The private state s is updated if needed after every request.
GenRequest	  
GenResponse	  
s	  
r1	  
S1	  
………...	  
Shuffle	  (s,	  S,	  A,	  π)	  
S2	  
GenRequest	  
GenResponse	  g2	   S3	  
r2	  
g1	  
Enc(π(A))	  
Sl	  
GenRequest	  
GenResponse	  gl	  
rl	  
Enc(A)	   S	  
S	  
User	   Cloud	  Storage	  
Figure 1: Illustration of a shuffle S executed by the client and the cloud storage server (Section 3.1).
In our cloud storage model, a shuffle S is a distributed computation executed by the user and the server.
The user runs the Setup algorithm to generate the encryption key and requests the server to allocate some
space. He then runs the Shuffle algorithm by accessing S through the server, that is, issuing requests to
the server using GenRequest. The set of possible requests is defined by the storage model supported by
the server. In our case this set is {get, put, getRange, putRange, getRangeDist, putRangeDist} (see Sec-
tion 2.2). For every request ri, the server executes GenResponse, locally updating S for put requests and
returning to the user the queried items for get requests. (See Figure 1 for an illustration.)
3.2 Security
We capture the security of a shuffle S against a curious server in the cloud storage model as a game, Shuffle-
IND, between S and a probabilistic polynomial-time bounded (PPT) adversary A. In this game, the inputs
and outputs of S that are revealed to the server in the cloud storage model are also revealed to A. However,
the secret state s kept by the client, any updates to it and computations inside of GenRequest are kept private,
since in the cloud model they are also hidden and happen on the user side.
The game starts with S running Setup once, allocating at the server space to be used in subsequent
computations. A then tries to “learn” how S performs the shuffle on a sequence of m1 input arrays and
permutations picked by A. Based on what A learns, she picks two challenges (A0, τ0) and (A1, τ1) each
consisting of a data array to be permuted using a corresponding permutation. S secretly picks one pair
and performs the shuffle according to it. The adversary is then allowed to observe S shuffling another
sequence of m2 (input, permutation) pairs, also picked by A. Finally, A has to guess which challenge pair
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(input, permutation) S picked to shuffle. Note that at any time, A can ask S to perform a shuffle on any
combination of A0 or A1 and permutations τ0 or τ1.
We now give a formal definition of the game.
Definition 3.2 (Shuffle-IND): Let A be an input array of size n picked by a PPT adversary A. A and S
engage in the following game.
S: (s, S)← Setup(1k).
for j ∈ {1, . . . ,m1}, where m1 is poly(k):
A: Pick array Bj and a permutation ρj .
S: Execute (Oj , α)← Shuffle(s, S,Bj , ρj). Reveal Oj and α to A.
A: Pick (A0, τ0) and (A1, τ1) of the same length.
S: Pick a secret bit b and execute (O,α)← Shuffle(s, S,Ab, τb). Reveal O and α to A.
for j ∈ {m1 + 1, . . . ,m1 +m2}, where m2 is poly(k):
A: Pick an encrypted array Bj and a permutation ρj .
S: Execute (Oj , α)← Shuffle(s, S,Bj , ρj). Reveal Oj and α to A.
A: Output bit b′.
The adversary wins the game if b = b′.
Using the Shuffle-IND game, we now define an oblivious shuffle.
Definition 3.3 (Oblivious Shuffle): Let k be the security parameter and n be a polynomial in k. S is an
oblivious shuffle over n items if for every probabilistic adversary A running in time polynomial in k, the
probability of winning the Shuffle-IND game, Pr[b = b′], satisfies
Pr[b = b′] ≤ 1
2
+ negl(k).
3.3 Performance
We measure the performance of an oblivious shuffle of an array of n itemsA using the following parameters:
Number of Requests: the number of calls the user and the server make to each other while performing the
shuffle. In the protocol, the number of requests is expressed using l, the length of the transcript α.
This parameter measures the efficiency of a shuffle algorithm.
Message Size: the maximum number of items that can be sent between the user and the server in a single
operation, i.e., the number of items sent in a request ri or a response gi.
User Private Memory: the size of user’s private memory s measured in terms of the number of items of A
that can be stored temporarily plus the space required to store an encryption key and a seed for a
pseudo-random permutation. The key and the seed are stored in the stateful part of s which is of a
constant size, while the space required to store the items is the scratch space required only during the
execution of the shuffle algorithm and is erased afterwards.
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User Computation: the amount of computation the user performs during the Shuffle algorithm, i.e., com-
putation inside of GenRequest(si, gi−1).
Server Storage: additional space required at the server besides storing n encrypted items of A. This is
captured by the datastore S in the protocol.
Server Computation: the computation performed by the server during GenResponse(Si, ri).
In the cloud storage model, we wish to devise efficient shuffle solutions that consider realistic assump-
tions about the user. For example, a user private memory of size n leads to a trivial and efficient solution
where the user can download the data from the server, shuffle and re-encrypt the items, and send them back.
Instead we wish to construct solutions that add a small overhead over a non-oblivious solution in terms of
the number of requests and client computation, but assume private memory and message size sublinear in n.
We will also assume that the server and the user can exchange more than one item in one message or call.
The size of each message is limited by the size of user’s memory since this is how many items she can
process at a time.
Finally, we consider current cloud storage providers that store user data and can efficiently retrieve and
write small amounts of data as requested by the user. Such storage providers charge their users according to
a pay-per-use model. Hence, we wish to limit space requirements of our solutions.
4 The Melbourne Shuffle
In this section, we present a basic version of our Melbourne shuffle algorithm. An optimized version is given
in the next section. The basic Melbourne shuffle uses private memory and messages of size O(
√
n log n),
O(n log n) server storage and processes in O(
√
n) requests. The optimized Melbourne shuffle has a smaller
message and memory overhead, and requires constant number more accesses to the server. In particular, it
relies on private memory and messages of size O(
√
n), O(n) server storage and O(
√
n) accesses.
An important ingredient of our solution is probabilistic encryption. Everything stored at the server is
encrypted and every time an item is read from the server, the user decrypts it, re-encrypts it and writes it
back. Since we use CPA-secure encryption, the ciphertexts produced for the same item always look different
and, hence, the server, aka the adversary, cannot tell whether the ciphertexts correspond to the same item or
not.
The goal of our oblivious shuffle is to reveal to the adversary only information that she would expect to
see in a random permutation with very high probability. For example, even for a secret permutation picked
uniformly at random, the adversary can guess with probability 1/n that the first element of the input array
of size n appears in some location i of the output permutation. Continuing with this intuition, suppose we
split the input array of size n into
√
n buckets where every bucket has
√
n items, and similarly for the output
permutation. In this case, using the analysis of the balls-and-bins model, the adversary can guess that with
high probability, each bucket in the output permutation has O(log n) elements from any particular bucket of
the input array.
We build on the observation above and move elements from input buckets to output buckets by imitating
the balls-and-bins process. That is, if the size of the input bucket is the same as the number of output buckets,
we place O(log n) elements of every input bucket in every output bucket. If the number of elements in a
bucket is much larger than the number of output buckets, i.e., the number of output buckets is n1/c
′
while
input bucket has n1/c items, for constants c and c′ s.t. c′ > c, then we move O(n1/c−1/c′) items to every
output bucket.
The reader may have noticed that in the first example above, elements of an input bucket of size
√
n are
placed in
√
n output buckets in batches of O(log n) items. What are the additional items? These additional
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items are referred to as dummy items. A dummy item is a real item with a fake key and some nonce value
such that the size of the dummy and real item are equal. Moreover, since all the data is re-encrypted every
time it is written to the server, the server cannot tell which items in a batch are real and which are dummy.
4.1 Overview
We assume that each element in the input array, A, is a key-value pair (x, v) for every x ∈ D. The algorithm
proceeds in two phases: distribution and clean-up. For each phase, the data store S is split in several logical
subparts: I , T and O. I is an array containing n encrypted items of the input A permuted according to some
permutation pi0 (initially, pi0 is the identity). T is an encrypted temporary array used during the shuffle;
finally, after the shuffle is done O contains the output of the shuffle, i.e., re-encrypted items of I permuted
according to pi. If the shuffle needs to be executed again, the user sets I ← O and pi0 ← pi. We further
divide each subpart of S in buckets of equal size. The number of buckets and how it effects the runtime of
the algorithm will be determined later.
During the distribution phase items of every bucket of I along with some dummy items are re-encrypted
and distributed equally among buckets of T . Here, the distribution of item (x, v) is done according to its
final location pi(x) in O. After the distribution phase the intermediate array T contains real and dummy
items. Moreover, the items appear in correct buckets but not in correct positions within each bucket. The
clean-up phase remedies this by reading one bucket at a time, removing dummy items, distributing the real
items correctly within the bucket and writing the bucket to O.
The distribution phase alone cannot produce every possible permutation since the number of items sent
from a bucket of I to a bucket of T is limited. E.g., the identity permutation cannot be achieved. To rectify
this, we execute two shuffle passes. First, for a permutation pi1 picked uniformly at random and then for
the desired permutation pi. Although this framework still allows failures, our algorithm can produce every
permutation, failing with very small probability independent of the desired permutation pi.
4.2 Algorithm
The complete shuffle algorithm shuffle(I, pi,O) is shown in Algorithm 1 where I is the encryption of the
input array A, pi is the desired permutation and the last argument is the output array where the algorithm is
expected to put an encryption of pi(A). We omit the Setup from the discussion since it is trivial: the client
simply runs a key generation to setup a secure encryption scheme and a seed generator for pseudo random
permutations.
The algorithm makes two calls to shuffle pass (Algorithm 2), first for a random permutation pi1 and then
for the desired permutation pi. We proceed with the description of shuffle pass(I, T, ρ,O) where I and O
are defined as in shuffle, T is a temporary array and ρ is the desired permutation. We use the convention
of giving arrays I , T and O as inputs to the shuffle pass algorithm for the ease of explanation. In the
cloud storage scenario that we consider here, one simply specifies the location where these arrays are stored
remotely, e.g., the name of a file and a location within it. Given an input array of size n, this method has
messages and client’s private memory of size O(
√
n log n) and server memory of size O(n log n). These
user and server memory requirements are temporary and are reduced to O(1) and n, respectively, when the
shuffle is finished. As mentioned before, method shuffle pass is split into a distribution phase and a clean-up
phase.
Distribution Phase The distribution phase of method shuffle pass (Algorithm 2), shown in Figure 2,
imitates throwing balls into bins by putting elements from every bucket of I to every bucket of T according
to the permutation ρ. In particular, a batch of p log n encrypted elements from every bucket of I is put
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Algorithm 1 The complete Melbourne shuffle algorithm, shuffle(I, pi,O), where the user can read and store
in private memory M up to
√
n× p log n elements, p ≥ e.
I: array of n encrypted elements (x, v); pi: permutation; O: permutation of I according to pi, where every
element is re-encrypted.
1: Let pi1 be a random permutation
2: Let T be an empty array of size n× p log n stored remotely
3: shuffle pass(I, T, pi1, O)
4: I ← O
5: shuffle pass(I, T, pi,O)
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Figure 2: Illustration of the distribution phase of shuffle pass (Algorithm 2). Shadowed regions represent
dummy values added to pad each batch to the size of p log n. The batches are encrypted, hence, one cannot
tell where and how many dummy values there are in each batch.
in every bucket of T (rev bucket[idT ] in the pseudo-code). Here, p is a constant and is determined in the
analysis.
Each batch contains real and dummy elements. The first batch is filled in with real elements (x, v) that
would go to the first bucket in O according to ρ, i.e., the elements for which bρ(x)/√nc = 0. Similarly for
every other batch. Since a bucket of I contains only
√
n elements and we put
√
n× p log n elements in total
in all buckets in T , most batches will have less than p log n elements. We pad such batches with dummy
elements to hide where and how many elements of I’s bucket are placed in T (line 18). Note that a batch is
re-encrypted before it is written to T , completely hiding the content and making it impossible to recognize
where dummy or real elements are (lines 10 and 18). If according to ρ more than p log n elements are
mapped from a bucket of I to a bucket of T , the algorithm fails (line 15). We later consider what happens in
case of a failure. We note that
√
n calls to putRange in the loop in lines 13-21 is for the ease of explanation
only. These calls can be substituted by a single call putRangeDist, putting
√
n × p log n elements all at
once. Hence, for every bucket read from I , there is only one corresponding write to T .
Clean-up Phase The distribution phase leaves T with two problems: first, though the elements are in
correct buckets according to ρ they are not in the correct locations inside the buckets, and second, T contains
dummy elements. To remedy these problems, the clean-up phase in Algorithm 2, illustrated in Figure 3,
proceeds by reading buckets of T of size
√
n× p log n and writing in their place buckets of size√n.
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Algorithm 2 Single pass shuffle pass(I, T, ρ,O) of the Melbourne shuffle algorithm, where the user can
read and store in private memory M upto
√
n× p log n elements.
I: array of n encrypted elements (x, v); T : auxiliary array that fits n × p log n encrypted elements, where
p is a constant that is a parameter of the algorithm; ρ: permutation; O: permutation of I according to ρ,
where every element is re-encrypted.
1: max elems← p log n
2: num buckets← √n
3: {Distribution phase: distribute elements of I into T}
4: for idI ∈ {0, . . . , num buckets− 1} do {read buckets of I}
5: bucketM ← getRange(I, idI ×
√
n,
√
n)
6: rev bucketM ← empty map() {Reverse map of bucket ids in T to elements}
7: for e ∈ bucketM do {Assign elements their bucket ids in T}
8: (x, v)← Dec(e)
9: idT ← bρ(x)/
√
nc {Bucket id of element (x, v) in T according to its location in O}
10: rev bucketM [idT ].add(Enc(x, v)) {Collect elements of same bucket}
11: end for
12: {Can be done via a single putRangeDist for√n batches of size max elems}
13: for idT ∈ {0, . . . , num buckets− 1} do {Distribute bucketM in buckets of T}
14: if size(rev bucketM [idT ]) > max elems then
15: fail {ρ moves more than p log n elements from a bucket of I to a bucket of T}
16: end if
17: {Hide how many real elements go to T ’s buckets by padding with encrypted dummies}
18: rev bucketM [idT ]← dummy pad(rev bucketM [idT ],max elems)
19: {Write a batch of max elems from every bucket of I to every bucket of T}
20: putRange(T, idT ×
√
n×max elems + max elems× idI , rev bucketM [idT ])
21: end for
22: end for
23: {Clean-up phase: clean T and write the result to O}
24: for idT ∈ {0, . . . , num buckets− 1} do {read buckets of T}
25: bucketM ← getRange(T, idT ×
√
n×max elems,√n×max elems)
26: {Decrypt the bucket, remove dummy, sort real elements using ρ and re-encrypt}
27: bucketM ← clean(bucketM )
28: {The distribution phase guarantees that bucketM contains exactly
√
n elements}
29: putRange(O, idT ×
√
n, bucketM )
30: end for
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Figure 3: An illustration of the clean-up phase of shuffle pass (Algorithm 2). Shadowed regions represent
dummy values that are removed during the clean-up phase.
When processing each bucket, the algorithm removes dummy elements, sorts the remaining content of
every bucket according to their final location in O (line 27). It is important to note that each written bucket
contains exactly
√
n elements before it is being written back. This follows from the fact that elements were
distributed to buckets according to the permutation ρ and the algorithm failed in the distribution phase for
those ρ that would have resulted in more than
√
n elements in each bucket.
Performance The performance of the Melbourne shuffle is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1: Given an input array of size n, the Melbourne shuffle (Algorithm 1) executes O(
√
n) op-
erations, each exchanging a message of size O(
√
n log n), between a user with private memory of size
O(
√
n log n) and a server with storage of size O(n log n). Also, the user and server perform O(n log n)
work.
Proof: We first note that
√
n calls to putRange in the loop in lines 13-21 is for the ease of explanation only.
These calls can be substituted by a single call putRangeDist, putting
√
n× p log n elements all at once.
A single shuffle pass in Algorithm 2 requires 2
√
n calls to getRange,
√
n calls to putRangeDist, and
√
n
calls to putRange, assuming the user and the server can exchange up to
√
n × p log n elements in a single
request. The shuffle in Algorithm 1 requires 8
√
n requests in total since it makes 2 calls to the shuffle pass
procedure. The private memory required at the user to perform the shuffle is
√
n × p log n. The required
server’s memory is n× p log n. However, this overhead is temporary since the increase in memory happens
only during the shuffle pass and is reduced to n when the shuffle is finished. Similarly for the user, the
memory of size
√
n× p log n is required only during the shuffle. We note that the total computation for the
user and the server is O(n log n).
4.3 Security Analysis
In this section, we show that the Melbourne shuffle (Algorithm 1) is oblivious for every permutation pi with
high probability.
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Definition 4.2: Let A be an array of n elements such that every x ∈ [1, n] is at location pi0(x) in A. Let B
be an array that stores a permutation pi of elements in A, i.e., B = pi(A). Split A and B in
√
n buckets of
equal size and fix a constant p ≥ e. Let pi be a permutation on n elements where every bucket of B contains
at most p log n elements of every bucket of A. We refer to the set of all such permutations as P (pi0).
Lemma 4.3: The size of set P (pi0) is (1− negl(n))× n!, for every permutation pi0.
Proof: Let pi be a random permutation from all possible n! permutations. We consider the relationship
between the input array A and a permutation of A, B = pi(A). We start by splitting A and B in buckets of
size
√
n and numbering buckets from 1 to
√
n using their order in each array. The analysis below estimates
how many permutations can be constructed by restricting the maximum number of elements from a bucket
of A appearing in any bucket of B to p log n.
Let Xba be a random variable that measures the number of elements from ath bucket of A present in bth
bucket of B. The mean value of Xba is 1, since we are distributing
√
n elements of a among
√
n buckets
of B. Although Xba, for 1 ≤ a, b ≤
√
n, variables are dependent between each other, we can use the Poisson
Approximation [19, Chapter 5.4] and instead work with n independent Poisson random variables Y ba with
mean 1.
Given n variables Y ba we are interested in bounding the probability of the event that there is no a and b
such that Y ba ≥ p log n. For a specific a and b it is:
Pr[Y ba ≥ p log n] ≤
1
e
(
e
p log n
)p logn
.
Using union bound, the probability that at least one of the Y ba s is greater than p log n is at most
n
1
e
(
e
p log n
)p logn
.
Since Y ba s are a Poisson approximation of the variables X
b
a, the probability that at least one of the X
b
as is
greater than p log n is at most
2n
1
e
(
e
p log n
)p logn
.
Setting p ≥ e we get
2n
1
e
(
e
p log n
)p logn
≤ 2n
(log n)p logn
=
2n
np log logn
= 2negl(n) = negl(n).
Lemma 4.4: Let pi0 be the initial permutation of n elements in the input array I . Method shuffle pass
(Algorithm 2) succeeds for all permutations ρ ∈ P (pi0).
Proof: The algorithm allocates elements of I in O according to ρ by first putting them into corrects buckets
(lines 4–22) and then sorting every bucket using ρ (line 27). By construction the algorithm fails for any
permutation ρ that requires more than p log n elements from a bucket of I mapped to buckets of O (line 14–
16).
Lemma 4.5: Method shuffle(I, pi,O) (Algorithm 1) is a randomized shuffle algorithm that succeeds with
very high probability.
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Proof: Let pi0 be the initial permutation of the input array I . Algorithm 1 makes two calls to shuffle
pass which succeeds for all possible permutations except for 1/nΩ(log logn) fraction of them (Lemmas 4.3
and 4.4). The first shuffle pass is executed for permutation pi1 on an input permuted according to some
permutation pi0. Since pi1 is picked using internal random coins, the probability of the shuffle pass failing
is independent of pi0 and is bounded by 1/nΩ(log logn). If the first shuffle pass did not fail, the shuffle pass
is executed second time with input permutation pi. The second shuffle is executed on the input array that is
permuted according to a random permutation pi1 ∈ P (pi0). The second pass does not fail iff pi1 ∈ P (pi).
Hence, Algorithm 1 fails if pi1 6∈ P (pi0) or pi1 6∈ P (pi). By Lemma 4.3, the probability of either of these
events is negligible in n, hence the basic Melbourne shuffle succeeds with very high probability for any pi0
and pi.
We show that method shuffle pass (Algorithm 2) is oblivious by mapping it to the Oblivious Shuffle
Model in Section 3.1, extracting the corresponding transcript and showing that the transcript reveals no
information about the underlying permutation if the encryption scheme is CPA secure (see Section 2.1).
Method shuffle pass (Algorithm 2) corresponds to GenRequest in the model and calls to getRange
and putRange trigger calls to GenResponse at the server. We do not describe GenResponse since it depends
on the implementation details of the remote storage provider. We are only interested in the fact that it
uses server’s state S to store and maintain arrays I, T and O. The transcript α of the shuffle execution is
defined as follows. The request ri is either getRange(S, i, l) or putRange(S, i, a), e.g., in line 29 (S, x, a) is
(O, idT ×
√
n, bucketM ). The response gi to getRange is an array a, e.g., a contains
√
n elements in line 5
and is stored in bucketM . The response to putRange is empty. We first analyze the metadata (Definition 2.1)
that corresponds to every request between the client and the server, and show that, unless the algorithm
fails, they depend on the size of the input only, and are independent from the input array and the desired
permutation. Hence, we obtain that the Melbourne shuffle is a data independent shuffle algorithm. We
finally show that if the content exchanged is encrypted, as it is in method shuffle pass (Algorithm 2), the
Melbourne shuffle (Algorithm 1) is oblivious.
Lemma 4.6: The metadata of requests exchanged between the client and the server in method shuffle pass
(Algorithm 2) is independent of permutation pi0 of the input I and output permutation ρ ∈ P (pi0), and
depends only on n.
Proof: Let α be a sequence of (request, response) pairs exchanged between the client and the server, de-
noted as (ri, gi), where ri is either a getRange or putRange and gi is bucketM for getRange and empty
for getRange. The sequence α can be further split in
√
n (getRange, putRange) calls that correspond to
distribution phase and
√
n (getRange, putRange) during the clean-up phase.
The metadata of putRange is the name of the array, the location within the array and how many elements
should be read. In the algorithm these correspond to reading an array of size n sequentially in buckets of
size
√
n (distribution phase, line 5) and
√
n × p log n (clean-up phase, line 25). These data depend only
on n and p. The metadata for a putRange call consists of the array to be accessed, the location where
to put the data and the size of the data to be written. In the algorithm, first calls to putRange place
√
n
batches of size p log n in the temporary array to locations that depend on the input bucket that has been read
using getRange (line 20). These locations are deterministic since getRange simply scans the input array.
The second sequence of calls to putRange happens during the clean-up phase when buckets of size
√
n are
written sequentially to the output array (line 29). These calls are also deterministic. It is also easy to show
that the transcript where a sequence of
√
n calls to putRange in lines 13-21 is substituted with a single call
to putRangeDist is also deterministic.
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Lemma 4.7: Let pi0 be the initial permutation of n elements in the input array I and let ρ be a permutation
from the set P (pi0). Method shuffle pass(I, T, ρ,O) (Algorithm 2) is an oblivious shuffle according to
Definition 3.3.
Proof: We showed in Lemma 4.4 that Algorithm 2 succeeds for all ρ ∈ P (pi0). We also showed that all
metadata in the transcript that is revealed to the adversaryA in the Shuffle-IND game in Definition 3.2 after
every call to Shuffle is independent of data content and hence can be determined based only on n and is
the same for any choice of input and output. The data content exchanged in each call does depend on the
data, however, it is always encrypted. We show that the security of the shuffle depends on the security of the
underlying encryption scheme.
To the contrary, we assume that there is a PPT adversary A that can distinguish with a non-negligible
advantage two permutations τ0 and τ1 by observing the transcript of one of them. Hence, this adversary
can win Shuffle-IND game. We show that if A exists then we can construct an adversary B who can use
A to win Enc-IND-CPA game with a non-negligible advantage, which would break our assumption about
the encryption scheme. We recall that in Enc-IND-CPA game B has access to oracles Enc and Dec and can
encrypt and decrypt sequences of messages of his choice, except asking for the decryption of the challenge
ciphertext.
We construct the adversary B as follows. B does not need to run Setup since he has oracle access to Enc
and Dec. A starts making calls to Shuffle on chosen pairs of input arrays and permutations. B imitates the
shuffle by responding with the encrypted permutation and a transcript α, that he can produce himself. He
continues doing so untilA comes up with a challenge of two (input, permutation) pairs (A0, τ0) and (A1, τ1).
B first creates a static transcript that will be the same for both permutations. He then, extracts all the calls to
be made to Enc into two sequences: one that corresponds to (A0, τ0) and one to (A1, τ1). He gives these two
sequences of elements to be encrypted to his own challenger. The challenger picks one sequence at random,
encrypts all its plaintexts (i.e., elements) one by one and gives the result to B. B combines the ciphertexts
with the metadata, that depend only on n, to create a valid transcript α and sends it to A. He continues,
responding to Shuffle requests from A until A outputs his guess b for the pair (Ab, τb). B outputs b as his
guess for which sequence of messages his challenger picked. Since A’s advantage in winning the game is
non-negligible so is B’s.
Theorem 4.8: The Melbourne Shuffle (Algorithm 1) is a randomized shuffle algorithm that succeeds with
very high probability and is data-oblivious according to Definition 3.3.
Proof:Algorithm 1 makes two calls to method shuffle pass, which is oblivious by Lemma 4.7. If Algo-
rithm 1 is not oblivious, then there is a PPT adversary A who can distinguish shuffle of two permutations.
If A exists, we can build an adversary B who can break the security of the underlying shuffle pass using A.
Whenever A makes a call to Shuffle for a permutation pi, B first picks a random permutation pi1 and calls
shuffle pass on pi1. It then uses the output of this call and pi to make another call to shuffle pass, this time
returning the output to A. This continues until A comes up with two challenge pairs (input, permutation)
(A0, τ0) and (A1, τ1). B first picks a random permutation and runs shuffle-pass on it. He then gives his own
challenger the output of this shuffle along with (A0, τ0) and (A1, τ1). The challenger returns to B the shuffle
according to (Ab, τb), keeping b secret. B forwards what he receives to A. B continues replying shuffle
requests of A as he did before until A makes a guess for b. B outputs this guess as his own.
Note that method shuffle pass outputs fail for some permutations. Whenever it does so, B sends this
information to A. However, as showed in Lemma 4.5 this happens with negligible probability for any pair
of input and output permutations and reveals nothing to the adversary about the output permutation since
the failure is due to secret random bits.
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5 The Optimized Melbourne Shuffle
In this section we present an optimized version of the Melbourne shuffle that has smaller memory require-
ments on the memory of the user and the server, and succeeds with higher probability than the basic version
of the previous section. The framework of the optimized version is similar: we first re-randomize the input,
i.e., shuffle it according to a random permutation pi′ and then shuffle pi′ towards the desired permutation pi.
The main difference with the basic version lies in the shuffle pass.
5.1 Algorithm
As in the basic version, the shuffle pass splits the input array I and the output array O in consequent buckets
of size
√
n. For auxiliary storage we use two temporary arrays T1 and T2 of size p1n and p2n, respectively,
where p1, p2 > 1 are constants to be determined in the analysis. We split T1 and T2 in buckets of size p1
√
n
and p2
√
n, respectively. The shuffle pass proceeds with two distribution phases, instead of one for the basic
version, followed by a single clean-up phase in the end. Detailed pseudo-code is given in Algorithms 3–6
Algorithm 3 The optimized Melbourne shuffle algorithm, optim shuffle(I, pi,O), where the user can read
and store in private memory M up to p2
√
n elements.
I: an array of n encrypted elements (x, v); pi: the desired permutation for elements of I; O: the output
array containing the permutation of I according to pi, where every element (x, v) is re-encrypted.
1: Let pi1 be a random permutation
2: Let T1 and T2 be two empty arrays stored remotely of size p1n and p2n, respectively
3: optim shuffle pass(I, T1, T2, pi1, O)
4: I ← O
5: optim shuffle pass(I, T1, T2, pi,O)
Algorithm 4 Single pass optim shuffle pass(I, T1, T2, ρ, O) of the optimized Melbourne shuffle algorithm,
where the user can read and store in private memory M up to p2
√
n elements.
I: an array of n encrypted elements (x, v); T1: an auxiliary array that fits p1n elements; T2: an auxiliary
array that fits p2n elements; ρ: the desired permutation for elements of I; O: the output array containing
the permutation of I according to ρ, where every elements (x, v) is re-encrypted.
1: distr phase1(I, ρ, T1)
2: distr phase2(T1, ρ, T2)
3: clean up phase(T2, ρ, O)
The first distribution phase moves elements from I to T1, the second distribution phase moves elements
from T1 to T2. We abstract the layout of elements in each array further by sequentially splitting buckets
in chunks. The goal of the first distribution phase is to place elements in correct chunks and place them in
correct buckets within the chunks in the second distribution phase. When a bucket is read, it is decrypted and
any elements that are written back are re-encrypted. In the following, we denote with ρ the target distribution
of the shuffle pass. For an array of size n, this algorithm assumes messages and client private memory of
size O(
√
n) and server memory of size O(n).
Distribution Phase I We view a sequence of 4
√
n buckets in each array as a chunk. Hence, I , T1, T2 and
O each have 4
√
n chunks. The goal of the first distribution phase is to place elements of I in T1 in such a
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way that all elements that belong to the first chunk of O according to ρ can be found in the first chunk of T1,
similarly for the second chunk, and so on. The pseudo-code for this phase is given in Algorithm 5.
Referring to the pseudo-code of Algorithm 5, the distribution proceeds by placing elements in chunks
at the bucket level (line 7). For every bucket in I , a batch with at most p1 4
√
n elements is moved to every
chunk of T1. The assignment of elements to chunks of T1 is determined by the permutation ρ that we wish
to achieve. In particular, an element (x, v) is placed in the bρ(x)/n3/4cth chunk of T1 (line 11). Note that
bρ(x)/n3/4c is the index of the chunk where (x, v) belongs in O since n3/4 is the size of a chunk in O.
As a result of placing
√
n elements in 4
√
n batches of size p1 4
√
n, some batches will not be full. We pad
such batches with dummy elements (line 21). If, on the other hand, more than p1 4
√
n elements need to be
moved according to ρ, the algorithm fails. We consider and analyze this case later. If the distribution suc-
ceeds, every chunk of T1 has exactly p1n3/4 elements with n3/4 real elements only. Note that here, as in the
distribution phase of the basic shuffle, 4
√
n calls in lines 15-24 can be substituted with a single putRangeDist
of size p1
√
n. For an illustration of this phase refer to Figure 4.
Algorithm 5 distr phase1(I, ρ, T1) of the optimized Melbourne shuffle algorithm, where the user can read
and store in private memory M upto p2
√
n elements, p1 ≤ p2.
I: an array of n encrypted elements (x, v); ρ: the desired permutation; T1: output array containing
encrypted elements in correct chunks according to ρ.
1: max elems← p1 4
√
n
2: num chunks← 4√n
3: num buckets← √n
4: chunk size← n3/4
5: {Distribution phase I: distribute elements of I in T1 according to their chunk index in O}
6: for i ∈ {0, . . . , num buckets− 1} do {go through buckets in I}
7: bucketM ← getRange(I, i×
√
n,
√
n)
8: rev bucketM ← empty map() {Reverse map of chunk ids in T1 to elements}
9: for e ∈ bucketM do {Assign elements their chunk ids according to ρ}
10: (x, v)← Dec(e)
11: cid← bρ(x)/chunk sizec {Chunk id of element (x, v) in the output shuffle}
12: rev bucketM [cid].add(Enc(x, v)) {Collect elements that correspond to the same chunk in T1}
13: end for
14: {Can be done via a single putRangeDist for 4√n batches of size max elems}
15: for cid ∈ {0, . . . , num chunks− 1} do {Distribute bucketM among chunks of T1}
16: if size(rev bucketM [cid]) > max elems then
17: {Permutation requires more than p1 4
√
n elements moved from a bucket of I to a chunk of T1}
18: fail
19: end if
20: {Hide how many real elements go to T1 from this bucket by padding with encrypted dummies}
21: rev bucketM [cid]← dummy pad(rev bucketM [cid],max elems)
22: {Write a batch of max elems from every bucket of I to every chunk of T1}
23: putRange(T1, cid× chunk size + i×max elems, rev bucketM [cid])
24: end for
25: end for
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Figure 4: Illustration of the arrangement of elements from the input I in the output T1 after the first distri-
bution phase of the Optimized Melbourne Shuffle (Section 5). See pseudocode in Algorithm 5.
Distribution Phase II Observe that elements in T1 belong to the correct chunk but not the correct bucket
within the chunk. The second distribution phase remedies this, such that by the end of this phase elements of
chunks of T1 are in their correct buckets in T2. The pseudo-code of this phase is presented in Algorithm 6.
Referring to the pseudo-code of Algorithm 6, we proceed by reading buckets of size p1
√
n in each chunk
of T1 (line 10). For every jth bucket of ith chunk of T1 we write 4
√
n batches of size p2 4
√
n to T2 (line 28).
The batches are written to all 4
√
n buckets of ith chunk in T2. A real element (x, v) is assigned to bρ(x)/
√
nc
mod n3/4th batch (line 15), which is the bucket id in the ith chuck of T2, where this batch will be written
to (line 28). Note that dummy elements added during the first distribution phase are ignored. If there is
a batch that no element has been assigned to or if a batch has less than p2 4
√
n elements, we pad it with
dummies. If there is a batch with more than p2 4
√
n elements, the algorithm fails. Note that i× 4√n+ bid is
the index of x’s bucket in O.
Once all the batches are set up, the batches are written in their place within the same chunk in T2.
Again, 4
√
n calls in lines 20-29 can be substituted with a single putRangeDist of size p2
√
n. When all
buckets of T1 have been processed, buckets of T2 contain p2
√
n elements each. This is a consequence of
writing a batch of p2 4
√
n elements from every chunk of T1. Moreover, every bucket of p2
√
n elements
contains all
√
n elements that belong to this bucket in O. For an illustration of this phase refer to Figure 5.
Clean-up Phase This phase is similar to the clean-up phase of the basic version, hence we omit its pseudo-
code. Recall that a bucket of T2 contains p2
√
n encrypted elements but contains only
√
n real elements
which are in the correct bucket but not in the correct spot within the bucket. We remedy this by reading
every bucket j ∈ [1,√n], decrypting it, removing dummy elements such that only √n real elements are
left, sorting it according to ρ, re-encrypting the elements and writing them back to the jth bucket of O.
Performance The performance of the optimized Melbourne shuffle is summarized in the following theo-
rem.
Theorem 5.1: Given an input array of size n, the optimized Melbourne shuffle (Algorithm 3) executesO(
√
n)
operations, each exchanging a message of size O(
√
n) between a user with private memory of size O(
√
n)
and a server with storage of size O(n). Also, the user and the server perform O(n) work.
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Algorithm 6 distr phase2(T1, ρ, T2) of the optimized Melbourne shuffle algorithm, where the user can read
and store in private memory M upto p2
√
n elements.
T1: array containing encrypted elements in correct chunks according to ρ; ρ: the desired permutation; T2:
output array containing encrypted elements in correct buckets according to ρ.
1: max elems← p2 4
√
n
2: num chunks← 4√n
3: num buckets← √n
4: bucket size← √n
5: chunk size← n3/4
6: num buckets per chunk← 4√n
7: {Distribution phase II: distribute elements of T1 in T2}
8: for i ∈ {0, . . . , num chunks− 1} do {go through chunks in T1}
9: for j ∈ {0, . . . , num buckets per chunk− 1} do {go through buckets in ith chunk}
10: bucketM ← getRange(I, i× chunk size + j ×
√
n, p1
√
n)
11: rev bucketM ← empty map() {Reverse map of bucket ids in T2 to elements}
12: for e ∈ bucketM do {Assign elements their bucket ids according to ρ}
13: (x, v)← Dec(e)
14: if (x, v) is real then {Ignore dummy elements}
15: bid ← bρ(x)/bucket sizec mod num buckets per chunk {Bucket id of element (x, v) in
ith chunk of T2}
16: rev bucketM [bid].add(Enc(x, v)) {Collect elements that correspond to the same bucket}
17: end if
18: end for
19: {Can be done via a single putRangeDist for 4√n batches of size max elems}
20: for bid ∈ {0, . . . , num buckets per chunk − 1} do {Distribute bucketM among buckets of T2 in
ith chunk)}
21: if size(rev bucketM [bid]) > max elems then
22: {Permutation requires more than p2 4
√
n elements moved from T1 to T2}
23: fail
24: end if
25: {Hide how many real elements go to T2 from this bucket by padding with encrypted dummies}
26: rev bucketM [bid]← dummy pad(rev bucketM [bid],max elems)
27: {Write a batch of max elems from every bucket of T1 to buckets in ith chunk in T2}
28: putRange(T2, i× chunk size + bid× p2
√
n+ j ×max elems, rev bucketM [bid])
29: end for
30: end for
31: end for
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Figure 5: Illustration of the arrangement of elements after processing two buckets of the first chunk of
the input T1 in the output T2 in the second distribution phase of the optimized Melbourne Shuffle. See
pseudocode in Algorithm 6. Read and written elements are indicated in gray and black colors.
Proof: A single optimized shuffle pass in Algorithm 4 requires 3
√
n calls to getRange, 2
√
n calls to
putRangeDist and
√
n calls to putRange when the user and the server can exchange up to p2
√
n elements
in a single request. Then, the optimized shuffle algorithm in Algorithm 3 requires 12 requests in total. The
size of the user private memory required to perform the shuffle is at most p2
√
n, while required server’s
memory is at most (p1 + p2)n. However, this overhead in server’s memory is temporary since this memory
is required only during the the distribution phases. Similarly, for the user private memory, the size ofO(
√
n)
is required while shuffling and is decreased to O(1) once it is finished. The total work for the user is O(n).
5.2 Security Analysis
In this section, we show that the optimized Melbourne shuffle is oblivious for every permutation pi with very
high probability.
Definition 5.2: LetA be an array of n elements such that for every 1 ≤ x ≤ n is at location pi0(x) inA. Let
B = pi(A) be a permutation on A. Split A and B in 4
√
n chunks of equal size and fix constants p1, p2 ≥ 1.
Split every chunk of A and B further in 4
√
n buckets of size
√
n.
We say that a permutation pi ∈ Q(pi0) if according to pi: (1) every chunk ofB has at most p1 4
√
n elements
from every bucket of A, and (2) if every bucket of B has at most p2 4
√
n elements from every chunk of A.
Lemma 5.3: The size of Q(pi0) is (1− negl(n))× n! for every permutation pi0.
Proof: Let A and B be arrays of n items. Split A and B in chunks of size n3/4 and then split each
chunk in 4
√
n buckets of size
√
n. The shuffle pass succeeds for any permutation that satisfies the following
two constraints. (1) Every chunk of B contains at most p1 4
√
n elements from every bucket of A and (2)
Each bucket of B has at most p2 4
√
n elements of the ith chunk of A. We compute the probability of a
uniform permutation not satisfying each of the constrains independently and use union bound to bound the
probability of failing at least one of the constraints.
Let Xba be the number of elements of ath bucket of A in bth chunk of B. Since there are
√
n elements
in every bucket of A and there are 4
√
n chunks in B, the mean of Xba is 4
√
n. As in Lemma 4.3 we use
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the Poisson approximation and use independent Poisson variables Y ba with mean value of 4
√
n. Then for a
specific a and b:
Pr[Y ba ≥ p1 4
√
n] ≤ e
− 4√n(e 4
√
n)p1
4√n
(p1 4
√
n)p1
4√n =
ep1 4
√
n
p1 4
√
n
(p1 4
√
n)p1
4√n =
ep1
p1p1
4√n .
Using union bound the probability:
Pr[
⋃
1 ≤ a ≤ √n
1 ≤ b ≤ 4√n
Y ba ≥ p1 4
√
n] ≤ n3/4 e
p1
p1p1
4√n = negl[n].
Hence,
Pr[∪Xba ≥ p1 4√n] ≤ 2 Pr[∪Y ba ≥ p1 4√n] = negl[n].
Consider the second constraint. Let Udc be the the number of elements of cth chunk of A in dth bucket
of B. Since there are n3/4 elements in every chunk of A and B has
√
n buckets, Udc is a Poisson random
variable with parameter 4
√
n. Using the Poisson approximation, letW dc be n
3/4 independent Poisson random
variables with mean 4
√
n. Similar to the analysis of the first constraint, the probability that there is at least
one bucket of B that has more than p2 4
√
n elements of a chunk of A is negl(n).
Using union bound the probability that at least one of the constraints is not satisfied is the sum of the
respective probabilities, hence, with probability 1 − neg(n), moving elements for a random permutations
via two levels will succeed.
Lemma 5.4: The metadata of requests exchanged between the client and the server in method optim shuffle pass
(Algorithm 4) is independent of input permutation pi0 and output permutation ρ ∈ Q(pi0), and depends only
on n.
Proof:[Sketch] We consider the metadata from getRange and putRange requests during the two distribution
phases and the clean-up phase. During the distribution phase I
√
n getRange calls are made with metadata
representing sequential get accesses to blocks of size
√
n of input I (line 7 in Algorithm 5). The call to
putRangeDist puts blocks of data of size p1
√
n to locations in T1 that are determined based on the id of the
block being read from I (lines 15–24 in Algorithm 5). Hence, metadata depend on the size of I , n, and does
not depend on the content.
During the distribution phase II, blocks of size p1
√
n are sequentially read using getRange on T1 (line 10
in Algorithm 6) and block are written back using putRangeDist to T2 of size p2
√
n (lines 20–29 in Algo-
rithm 6). Hence, metadata is deterministic based on n.
Clean-up phase sequentially reads blocks of size p2
√
n from T2 and writes back blocks of size
√
n,
independent of the data. Hence, metadata, produced by Algorithm 4 is data independent.
Lemma 5.5: Let pi0 be the initial permutation of n elements in the input array I . Algorithm 4 succeeds for
all permutations ρ ∈ Q(pi0) and is data-oblivious according to Definition 3.3.
Proof:[Sketch] The algorithm can fail during the first or second distribution phases (lines 18 in Algorithm 5
and 23 in Algorithm 6). The first failure happens when distributing a bucket of size
√
n of I among 4
√
n
buckets in T1 and there is a bucket that needs to put more than p1
√
n of its elements to one of the buckets
according to the input permutation ρ. This failure represents failure to satisfy the first condition of Defini-
tion 5.2 of Q(pi0).
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The second distribution phase results in a failure when one of the buckets in T1, formed in the previous
step, is distributed among 4
√
n buckets of T2 and requires more than p2 4
√
n of its elements in one of the
buckets of T2. This corresponds to failing the second condition of Definition 5.2. Hence, Algorithm succeeds
for all permutations in Q(pi0).
The metadata produced by the algorithm is data-independent as showed in Lemma 5.4. Since data is
re-encrypted every time it is written back in getRange we can use the reduction similar to Lemma 4.7 to
show that the security of the shuffle depends on Enc-IND-CPA secure encryption scheme.
Theorem 5.6: The optimized Melbourne Shuffle (Algorithm 3) is a randomized shuffle algorithm that suc-
ceeds with very high probability and is data-oblivious according to Definition 3.3.
Proof:[Sketch] Algorithm 3 runs the optimized shuffle pass algorithm in Algorithm 4 twice. Each shuffle
pass succeeds if the desired permutation is from the set Q(pi0), where pi0 is the original permutation of the
input I . Running the shuffle twice: once for a random permutation pi1 and then for the desired permutation,
ensures that the algorithm can succeed for every permutation with very high probability, where the proba-
bility depends on random coin tosses that determine the intermediate random permutation pi1. We showed
in Lemma 5.5 that Algorithm 4 is data-oblivious, hence, running it twice also produces a data-oblivious
algorithm (same reduction argument as in Theorem 4.8).
6 The Melbourne Shuffle with Small Messages
The Melbourne shuffle and its optimized version can be extended to work with messages and private memory
of size n1/c log n (or n1/c for the optimized version), for c ≥ 3.
The idea behind the approach is to run the algorithm recursively with depth c − 1. For a fixed c, one
first splits the output in large buckets of size n(c−1)/c and executes the shuffle as in the square root case:
distributing n1/c among n1/c large buckets. We call this the first level of the recursion. After this, each large
bucket has correct elements but not in correct buckets nor positions. The square root shuffle is executed
again on each large bucket, but now splitting the large bucket of size O(n(c−1)/c log n) (O(n(c−1)/c) for
the optimized version) in n(c−2)/c buckets and again using only n1/c private memory. The client follows
the recursion until the size of the inner buckets becomes O(n2/c) when elements can be distributed in their
correct buckets of size n1/c. At this point, the buckets are small enough that they can be read to private
memory during the clean-up phase and be placed in correct positions within their bucket. Hence, there are
c−1 levels of recursion. Each level i requires a block of n(c−i)/c buckets, each of size n1/c, to be distributed
among n1/c output buckets. Since every level has n(i−1)/c blocks, the square root solution is required to be
executed n(i−1)/c times per level, each making O(n(c−i)/c) accesses. Hence, the total number of requests
can be expressed as
∑c−1
i=1 O(n
(c−i)/c × n(i−1)/c) = O((c− 1)n(c−1)/c).
For the Melbourne shuffle that uses private memory and messages with a multiplicative log n factor
(Section 4), the naive solution could accumulate the O((log n)c) factor if used naively. This happens due to
reading n1/c elements and writing back O(n1/c log n) elements and clean-up phase not being able to reduce
this to n1/c until the last level of the recursion. One can prevent this by observing that when distributing n2/c
elements among n1/c output buckets, every bucket will have at most n1/c of its elements in every output
bucket, with very high probability (by using Chernoff bounds [19, Chapter 4]). Hence, after distributing
O(log n) elements from buckets of size n1/c, we can make another sequential pass, reading n1/c log n
elements at a time (i.e., the elements that were contributed by batches of size log n from n1/c buckets) and
applying the fact that all together they could not contribute more than O(n1/c) elements, and hence writing
22
back only O(n1/c). Note that we remain data-oblivious, since again we are using the observation of what
the adversary would expect to see with very high probability.
We note that each recursive level does not depend on higher levels and, hence, has the same memory
requirements as a single shuffle pass of the corresponding algorithm.
Theorem 6.1: Given an integer constant c ≥ 3 and an input array of size n, the optimized Melbourne shuffle
executes O(cn(c−1)/c) operations, each exchanging a message of size O(n1/c) between a user with private
memory of size O(n1/c) and a server with storage of size O(n). Also, the user and server perform O(cn)
work.
7 Applications
In this section, we show how the Melbourne shuffle can be efficiently parallelized on a PRAM. We also
show how to use the Melbourne shuffle to obtain an efficient oblivious storage solution.
7.1 PRAM
In the EREW PRAM model,
√
n processors can agree on a seed for a permutation of the shuffle and run the
shuffle as specified below. If privacy is not an issue, encryption and decryption calls can be omitted from
the algorithms to get a data independent shuffle algorithm.
Theorem 7.1: The (optimized) Melbourne shuffle can be executed in O(1) steps by
√
n processors, each
with O(
√
n log n) (O(
√
n)) private memory, that access a shared memory of size O(n log n) (O(n)) via
EREW protocol.
Proof: (Sketch) Label each processor with an id from 0 to
√
n− 1. During the shuffle pass in Algorithm 2
every bucket idI of I can be read by the idI th processor from the shared memory. The processor creates
batches of elements that go from his bucket to output buckets in the shared memory. He then can write
the batches to the locations of the shared memory of O as specified in line 20 of Algorithm 2 by using
processor’s id instead of idI . During the clean-up phase each processor can read the bucket of O with the
same id as his processor id and write it back. (Changes to Algorithm 4 are analogous.)
7.2 Oblivious Storage
In this section, we give an overview of a secure and efficient oblivious storage scheme that uses the Mel-
bourne shuffle. The oblivious storage (OS) we consider here follows the framework proposed in [6] and the
follow-up work of [12]. The goal of the oblivious storage is to hide client’s access pattern to his remotely
stored data from anyone observing it, including the storage provider. Informally, OS transforms a virtual
sequence of requests into a simulated one that appears to be data-independent. This is achieved by a mixture
of accesses that are the same for every access sequence (e.g., the Melbourne shuffle) and of accesses that
are randomized, and come from the same distribution, hence they appear to be independent of the access
sequence.
OS Scheme Our OS scheme consists of setup, access and rebuild phases. The setup phase arranges,
encrypts and outsources the data to the remote storage server. The access phase transforms a virtual request
into a sequence of accesses to the remote storage. Once these accesses are performed, the requested element
is returned. After a batch of requests, the data at the server is shuffled in order to be able to proceed with the
access phase for the next batch.
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We provide a short description of the square root OS solution [6] and show how the Melbourne Shuffle
improves its performance.
In the following description we assume that the user and the server can exchange messages of size
O(
√
n) and the client’s memory is also O(
√
n).
Setup Let A be an array on n items. The client extends A by adding
√
n fake elements with keys n +
1, n+ 2, . . . , n +
√
n. He then encrypts A using Enc-IND-CPA secure encryption to get an array I , which
he sends to the server to store. The client picks a secret permutation, PRP pi and calls shuffle(I, pi,O) where
O is the location at the server where the shuffled and encrypted array of A is stored. We set I ← O for the
access phase. The user also allocates at the server an empty cache C that can fit encryptions of up to
√
n
requested elements. As we shall see, the number of non-empty locations in C is the total number of requests
that were made to remote storage since the last time I was shuffled. We refer to how many elements are
present in C as l. The client remembers the seed that generated pi so that he can find the elements during the
access phase.
Access Phase Given the cache C, the encrypted array I and a request read(x) or write(x, v′) the access
phase creates the following oblivious simulation that depends on n, the total number of accesses made so
far, and secret PRP pi. It starts by reading the cache with a single request since the cache fits in one request
message and in client’s memory. It decrypts the cache and checks if an element with the key x is present
in C. If so, it remembers the element (x, v). Then, a location in I is accessed as follow. If the element was
found in the cache a fake element with the key n + l is accessed by requesting the location pi(n + l) of I .
Otherwise, the location that stores the element with the key x is accessed, by requesting location pi(x) of I .
After reading the cache and making one request to I , the user has the desired element (x, v). If the original
request was read he writes encrypted element (x, v) to the first empty location in C on the server, if it was
a write, the client writes (x, v′) instead. This phase can proceed this way for
√
n − 1 more requests, after
that the cache fills up and the rebuild phase follows. This phase requires 3 accesses to the remote storage
per every requested element.
Rebuild Phase The goal of the rebuild phase is to free C by placing updated elements back to I and
shuffle I using a new secret permutation pi′ that is independent of pi. This step has to be done in a data-
oblivious manner to prevent correlations between access patterns to I before and after reshuffle. One first
writes C to I by reading C in private memory and then reading buckets of size
√
n of I , updating them with
elements of C, if needed, and writing them back re-encrypted. After merging the cache C and I we are
ready to call the Melbourne shuffle via shuffle(I, pi′, O). The client updates the seed that generated pi′ in his
private memory and allocates an empty cache C at the server. The rebuild takes O(
√
n) accesses if we use
the optimized Melbourne Shuffle.
Deamortized Oblivious Storage The overall cost of the shuffle can be amortized over a batch of
√
n
requests to achieve O(1) overhead. We could also deamortize this by using the method of [11]. The method
involves doubling the space at the server by adding a second cache of size
√
n and memory of size n+
√
n
where the rebuild is happening “behind the scenes” during the access phase. The rebuild on the new array
is done by batching its requests with the requests from the access phase. The client now does a constant
increase in the amount of work and has a new permutation ready when the cache is full. The performance
of the above OS scheme base on the optimized Melbourne shuffle is summarized in the following theorem.
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Theorem 7.2: The randomized oblivious storage scheme based on the optimized Melbourne shuffle has the
following properties, where n is the size of the outsourced dataset:
• The private memory at the client and each message exchanged between the client and server have
size O(
√
n).
• The memory at the server has size O(n).
• The access overhead to perform a storage request is O(1).
Extension to Small Messages The recursion could be applied to square root solution, when messages of
size n1/c are used to exchange between the user and the server, and the user has n1/c private memory. The
solution contains one cache of size n1/c, that is small enough to fit into private memory and be read using
one request, and c − 1 levels. Each level i is large enough to contain n(i+1)/c real elements and ni/c fake
elements. The cache and levels 1 to i − 1 have a similar cache functionality for level i as the cache C
in the square root solution, except together they can store O(ni/c) previously accessed elements. Each
level i < c − 1 contains n(i+1)/c buckets of size O(log n) that allows one to store n(i+1)/c elements in a
hash table and avoid collisions with very high probability. Buckets that have less than log n elements, real
or fake,are filled in with dummies. The last level, level c − 1, has n elements, hence a permutation can be
used to store and access the elements.
Given the memory arrangement of the extension with small messages at the server from Section 7.2, the
access and rebuild phases proceed as follows.
Access phase requires a total of c+ 1 accesses to the server: read the cache of size n1/c, read O(log n)
size bucket from every c− 2 levels, read one element from the last level, write an updated cache back. Note
that each bucket can be read into memory since we assume private memory and messages of size O(n1/c).
Hence, O(c) accesses are required to access an element obliviously. The access phase proceeds as follows:
read the cache, if an element is found access a new fake element from level 1, and proceed with fake accesses
from then on. Otherwise, look up the bucket using a hash function of level 1 where the element is supposed
to be if it was read before. Again, proceed with consequent fake accesses, if the element was found, or keep
looking for the element.
Rebuild phase: After n1/c elements have been accessed, level 1 is rebuilt taking O(n1/c log n) accesses
to be rebuilt using the Melbourne Shuffle for small messages (see Section 6). Similarly, when (i-1)th level
is full it requires shuffling of n(i+1)/c log n elements at level i using O(i× ni/c log n) accesses. Finally, the
last level requires O((c− 1)n(c−1)/c) accesses to rebuild. We could amortize the cost of the rebuilds to get
O(c log n) amortized, or deamortized using [11], access overhead per every element. We could also increase
message size to O( c
√
n log n) and use the optimized Melbourne shuffle to achieve a constant overhead from
the rebuild, since now the rebuild for level i takes O(ni/c) accesses and can be (de)amortized over O(ni/c)
elements that caused it. Hence, with messages of size c
√
n log n, and using the optimized Melbourne shuffle
we get O(c) (de)amortized access overhead.
Though, this solution resembles the Hierarchical Solution of [6] by using buckets of size log n at every
level, it has two important differences. The expansion factor from level to level is n1/c, instead of 2, hence,
we only have c levels, and the rebuild phase uses our shuffle algorithm instead of a more expensive oblivious
sort.
Theorem 7.3: The randomized oblivious storage scheme based on the Melbourne shuffle with small mes-
sages has the following properties, where n is the size of the outsourced dataset and c is a constant such that
c ≥ 3:
• The private memory at the client and each message exchanged between the client and server have size
O( c
√
n) (O( c
√
n log n)).
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• The memory at the server has size O(n).
• The access overhead to perform a storage request is O(c log n) (O(c)).
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